

# The combat S2 survival guide observations and LLs for the maneuver battalion intelligence officer.

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## Introduction

Ten years of Army experience, private through captain, led me to believe that no task was too demanding or challenging. As my time as an Infantry officer came to a close, I imagined a future in Military Intelligence (MI) that would be less stressful, more technical, and somewhat less relevant than the eight years of "ground pounding" that was now ending. I was dead wrong. My time as an Infantry Battalion S2 in combat would prove to be the most demanding, relevant, and satisfying assignment that I have yet to hold. My belief is that I will never again experience an assignment that can compete with my time as a combat "2."

I spent the last five years of my commissioned career at Fort Lewis, Washington, a member of the Army's first Stryker Brigade. Leading my rifle platoon through the streets of Mosul, Iraq, serving as a rifle company executive officer, and even harkening back to my time as a combat engineer shaped my ability to confidently advise the commander and recommend sound options for defeating a committed enemy. Battalion S2s must use all of their experiences along with tapping into the experiences of others to be successful. The purpose of this article is to provide focus for the new S2. It is not an all encompassing view of the S2 world, but instead will provide insight to the most critical tasks that will ensure the success of combat operations. There is much written on the subject, but lacks input from company grade officers with recent experience. My intent is to allow new or existing 2s to apply time and resources to the most important facets of the mission that they are required to provide to the battalion. I served as the S2 for the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 3-2 SBCT for 2 years without attending the MI Captains Career Course. I have experienced tactical intelligence work as a land owning unit in Mosul (SASO/COIN), as the Multi-National Division-Baghdad "strike force" (attacking key nodes), and my battalion spear-headed the mission to liberate and secure the capital of the Islamic State of Iraq in Baqubah. Operations in Baqubah were as close to high intensity conflict that you can get in the current operational environment.

All of these experiences are quite different from the intelligence perspective and have taught me a broad range of tactics, techniques, and procedures that I feel are necessary to share with the current cadre of intelligence professionals. This is not meant to be an over generalization, but my observation is that most intelligence officers just don't grasp the concepts necessary for success.

Intelligence officers need to work together to move beyond the MI oxymoron, and create a new level of confidence for commanders and credibility to our profession. We are the means to the end of our nation's War on Terrorism, and the sculptors of the future operations that will ensure our freedom. I don't want to sound cliché, but there is no job more important. Every day as an intelligence officer allows for the saving or the sacrifice of human life. That responsibility is ours to uphold.

The maneuver battalion is the tip of the spear and the ultimate end user of the intelligence community (IC). As such, a maneuver S2 must be a competent tactician and an expert at managing information. Above all, a battalion S2 must be a leader. There are several misconceptions that linger in the IC. The first is that analysts must be treated differently than other Soldiers because they have a requirement to think freely and analyze without the constraints that other Soldiers have. This is absolutely false. Analysts need structure, discipline, and firm limits on what they can and cannot do. They need confident and competent leaders to focus their efforts and extract the very best analysis that supports the mission. If you waiver or your expectations are not clearly defined and enforced, you will have already lost half of your analytical capability. Do not coddle your Soldiers; instead, strive to empower and inspire them with leadership. Do not accept mediocrity from your analysts and do not accept excuses from your subordinate leaders. Be a leader on your staff! The S2 is the most important part of the combat staff. Embrace and own the position; do not allow yourself to be an afterthought at any part of the planning process. Do not be intimidated or subordinated to fellow staff members. Make sure your assessments are heard. Due to the critical nature of the job, always do your own work. Never rely on anyone else's assessments and analysis to keep your unit's Soldiers safe and to keep your operations ahead of the enemy. Use other products as tools and background information to formulate your own take on the enemy situation. Never assume that someone is as interested as you are in your area of operations (AO).

## Expectations

There are some baseline skills that commanders, staff, and Soldiers will expect of you as the S2. You may not start out as an expert in any of these, but you should constantly try to improve upon them. Tactical expertise is the most important skill that an S2 must possess and an attribute that others will expect you to apply to your profession. The combat S2 must understand how the unit fights down to the team and individual level. This is generally the hardest skill for MI officers to acquire. You must know how the U.S. Army fights in the current environment and you must understand the operational capabilities of your unit and its Soldiers. Conversely, you must understand the same about the enemy. In the current environment, you should focus on small unit tactics (SMUT) that terrorists and insurgents employ on the battlefield. If you are unfamiliar with these tactics, become friends with H. John Poole, who has written a series of books on enemy SMUT. These books explore fundamentals and specific tactics preferred by threat groups, and are arguably the best tools to educate the MI officer on enemy SMUT. You will also be expected to understand the overall goals of your adversary and create broad assessments that analyze and portray the overall intent of the enemy.

You will also be expected to articulate complex thoughts in a simplified way. This is an art that you may have to massage to get right. You work for Soldiers; be able to talk to them. You must be a confident briefer, prepared to brief at all levels. You will brief Soldiers, general officers, and everyone in between; be prepared to modify your style and verbiage. Confidence comes with a firm grasp of the enemy situation and your assessments. You must know your products inside

and out. Remember that 80 percent of your work will never be presented; be prepared to back up your assessments with reinforcing data and products. The final expectation is your ability to manage the battalion's information requirements. There is always a plethora of questions that require an answer. It is your responsibility to prioritize and focus collection to answer the information requirements that will most directly impact the mission.

## Personal Relationships

The art of developing and maintaining personal relationships within the IC cannot be over emphasized. Its execution can define the success or failure of the tactical level intelligence officer. Just as there is a vast amount of data and information prevalent on the battlefield, so too are the number of people competing for resources and tools to exploit this information. It is a well known that the IC is plagued by a crisis of isolationism. This is not because of the lack of individual desire to share information and assets, but is a byproduct of a compartmentalized system in which assets and information are constrained to certain individuals and lines of communication. Since 9/11, great progress has been made to streamline the dissemination of information, and with major hostilities on multiple fronts the proliferation of intelligence assets has had a substantial impact on Army operations, yet the value of creating personal relationships has not diminished in the least.

As a battalion S2, organic intelligence collection is restricted to the use of ground troops. Information requirements on the contemporary battlefield dictate the need to depend on higher and outside agencies to stay ahead of the enemy. Every person you meet in the IC could become an asset or ally at some point during your fight. The S2 who works in isolation or cannot cooperate with others is destined to fight over the scraps of what is left after everyone else has taken their share. The S2 must never perpetuate the attitude that "you work for my unit and you will do what I tell you and how I tell you", rather the savvy S2 makes others want to work for his unit by making outside agencies feel integrated, relevant, and informed. Other units require feedback and often feel isolated from the mission, even though their assets or information are absolutely critical to the mission. Keep them informed of what your unit is doing and praise their Soldiers for the support they offer. It is your job to request, manage, and incorporate their assistance. If you isolate yourself or act in an obnoxious and abrasive way, your unit will pay the price. In many cases, you are asking for help from persons or agencies that do not have a requirement to support you. Every piece of information garnered and every asset added to the fight saves lives and provides more means to neutralize the enemy. The IC is small, and reputations tend to dictate how much or how little support you may receive. Work hard to build and maintain your reputation and credibility in the IC.

## Train for the Fight

I cannot emphasize enough the importance of providing realistic training prior to deployment. Creating realistic intelligence training requires creativity and a sound knowledge of the current threat environment. I would encourage you to create two training models. The first is a "reach forward" model using whatever SIPR access you can get. Choose a unit that is forward and start to pull all of its data and build products. Use actual events and activities to train and exercise both you and your analysts. Present the products to your commander and S3 so you can iron out formatting issues prior to deployment. This provides you the ability to do short term analysis and evaluate the results based on actual events. This is the most productive way to spend your time in garrison.

The second training model is to incorporate intelligence into every company training event that occurs. Create an intelligence scenario that supports the training exercise. Build props that will facilitate exercising the intelligence cycle down to the fire team level. Use documents, role play, weapons, photos, and low-level intelligence problems to stimulate your primary collectors. Use this to exercise your reporting and dissemination systems both to higher and lower. Create a deliberate intelligence dissemination system that includes intelligence summaries, battle update briefs, SPOT reports, patrol debriefs, and feedback products that portray intelligence success that originated with your units. Feedback should never be overlooked; it will exponentially increase the amount of cooperation and information your collectors provide. Enforce the debrief and use your analysts to process and analyze the information; then disseminate relevant intelligence to the force. Always incorporate your HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) into unit training, they can use this time to develop rapport with your units and educate tactical leaders on how to support their intelligence collection mission. Incorporation of HCTs will also allow you to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of your HUMINT Soldiers.

If you have Soldiers who are struggling, attempt to re-train them on key tasks, but if that does not work send them back to your MI company. Attached Soldiers that are ineffective are a distraction to operations and should be removed if they do not add capability to your section. Integrating into maneuver training will set your section up for success. It creates knowledge and confidence in the intelligence apparatus for the maneuver Soldiers, and it exercises the critical task of disseminating intelligence for your section. If you are able to successfully incorporate these training models you will eliminate the frustration that normally comes with slogging through your first few months of deployment trying to rectify insignificant details of products.

Individual Soldier training in garrison should be focused on systems and programs. In general, if you learn the program, the data will take care of itself. There are some programs that are mission essential and your analysts must be able to employ them at an expert level. The baseline skills reside with MS Office. Analysts must be proficient at MS Excel and PowerPoint. ArcGIS is an application that will provide you with battle-tracking, mission planning, and printable map capabilities. This program is the best on the market and rivals FalconView in its capabilities. However, it is extremely complex and requires a high level of training. It is well worth the time to train your analysts on ArcGIS. The Distributed Common Ground Station-Army is a great web-based tool that is evolving to be the baseline system supporting Army operations at all levels.

Training is time consuming but will pay great dividends in time management and analytical support. Learn how to set up, manipulate, and load frequencies on the remote video terminal, one system remote video terminal, and ROVER. These interface with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and your section must understand how to employ and operate them in static (tactical operations center (TOC)) and mobile (vehicle mounted) modes. U.S. Air Force TACPs are subject matter experts on this equipment and are a good source for training. The Biometrics Automated Toolset and the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment are great tools for databasing personalities and can be incorporated in a myriad of ways to support operations. HCTs should be experts with this system, your section must have a working knowledge of base station operations and file transfers, and Soldiers in your units must be experts at the use of the handheld devices. Take ownership of this training and work with your S3 to get it on the calendar. These programs and systems are not an all inclusive list, but a good place to start for someone new to the business.

Analytical training must start with the basics and slowly evolve into an environment which facilitates understanding of complex intelligence problems and the analysis of second and third order effects. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is the most crucial skill set to train and exercise. There are two basic types to be familiar with. Macro IPB is the analysis of large areas and intelligence problems; it is the basis for which all planning is conducted on a given area. A situation template (SITEMP) is the most common product associated with macro IPB. It describes in detail the environment, effects, enemy, and their likely courses of action (COAs) based on the environment.

Micro IPB is the detailed planning and assessment of a single enemy entity in a specified location. Micro IPB is the baseline of all targeting or execution of specialized operations. It incorporates all the factors of the macro, but is extremely detailed in nature. An example is a completed target packet that considers all of the possible circumstances that will affect the executing unit (e.g., which way the door is hinged, wall height). Analysts must be trained to create products at this level of detail and to answer the questions that will supplement these products.

In all cases, your analysts need to be able to think like the Soldiers on the ground and identify with their information needs. IPB should be understood in depth by your analysts at every level, your subordinate leaders should be solid practitioners of it, and you have to be an expert. Testing IPB skills is an easy and practical way to evaluate the proficiency of your section. Choose any small area of the world (city or less), create a short operational scenario, set a deadline, and allow them to proceed with no guidance. If they understand the key concepts, they will produce a coherent and organized product in a short time. If they need some work, coach them through the process using realistic examples that mimic the current threat environment. Every attempt should be made to ingrain the IPB process into your analysts. Create a poster that outlines the process and post it in your work area. Have Soldiers outline their upcoming weekend using the steps of IPB, and exercise routinely at the micro and macro levels. Knowledge of the IPB process is the key to success.

Cultural knowledge and awareness is a fundamental area that intelligence personnel should emphasize in any training program. Understanding the history and principles of the Islamic faith is a great tool to spur thought outside the confines of conventional operations. Few members of our community have a firm working knowledge of the pillars of Islam, the schism between Sunni and Shia, Islamic writings and who uses them, and how Islam is applied throughout the world.

Additionally, analysts should be able to ascertain the difference between terrorists, insurgents, criminals, fundamentalists, and guerrillas. These terms are often used interchangeably but should be used specifically by intelligence analysts. Never limit your training objectives to the current threat environment. Train on various religions, ideologies, and political groups.

Geography is another critical area often overlooked where knowledge enables comparative analysis of geographic areas associated or relative to the one you are studying. Have your analysts fill in a blank map of the Middle East and Southwest Asia to evaluate geographic skills. Cover ethnic issues and ensure analysts are able to differentiate between ethnic, racial, political, and religious differences in populations. Although these concepts are simplistic in nature, they augment the analytical capabilities of the individual and will filter through your section.

Threat group classification and awareness should be at the forefront of analytical training. Understanding ideology, tactics, and strategic and operational goals of individual threat groups is the foundation of a suitable enemy COA. Threat groups will differ in their application of resources, funding, and treatment of the local population. Focus your training on the current threat environment, but be sure to emphasize the global nature of many threat groups. Groups like Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Irish Republican Army have global relationships and agendas that shape the form of tactical operations. Understanding these aspects of each group allows the analyst to compare relationships, contrast agendas, and sometimes identify anomalies that may be the cornerstone of solving intelligence problems in your area of concern. The evolving nature of these groups forces the analyst to conduct regular research to stay on top of the latest paradigm and innovative methodologies. Institute a personal goal to discern and understand the 10 major global threat groups and their ties to major state actors. Comprehension of threat groups will supplement enemy COAs, provide meat to SITEmps, and allow you to effectively communicate the threat to your commander.

### Organize Your Section

With the advent of technology and the proliferation of intelligence systems, the resulting preponderance of information is overwhelming. Few changes have been made to the authorized manning levels of intelligence sections throughout the Army. You will process and analyze more information than your predecessors. You have the obligation to mitigate this. Request Soldiers from the line to augment your section, train them on basic analytical skills and functions. Request analysts from your MI company and train them to operate within a battalion setting. These are major issues that you will have to fight to acquire the needed resourcing. You are required to persuade your commander to support and increase manning in the intelligence section on the basis that a shortfall in manning will result in a mission failure. Always task organize for the fight at hand, be flexible and prepared to launch a competent forward intelligence package to support your battalion's operations. Plan and rehearse the utilization of this package before you are in contact.

When operating independently from your brigade, demand multi-INT support to facilitate operations. You will require direct support teams from your brigade and higher to effectively operate when you are detached from your brigade. When receiving Soldiers with specialized skills, put them to work using their INTs to solve the intelligence problems your battalion is facing. Supervise these Soldiers and evaluate their contributions to your mission. Organically assess the strengths and weaknesses of every member of your team. Always cross train on systems, but focus individuals in areas of strength.

Have an intelligence apparatus at the company level. Much has been written on this subject and it appears that the concept has support from all levels to increase future intelligence manning for battalions. In the interim, find a solution at the company level and ensure that your commander and S3 firmly back the plan. This will prevent push-back or misuse of the apparatus. Whatever your company apparatus is, ensure you train and exercise reporting procedures and requirements. Most importantly, place yourself at the point on the battlefield where you can best leverage assets and provide intelligence support to the commander and his subordinate commanders. Most often, an S2 is better served by staging at the TOC where the systems are in place to provide real-time analysis and recommendations to any situation that arises. There is not much an S2 can do sitting in the belly of a vehicle with little situational awareness and understanding. There will also be times when you need to be at the front to advise and plan on

the fly. Incorporate the assistant S2 into planning and discussion. Where can he benefit the battalion most? Discussion with your commander on this topic is imperative. Explain the benefits and limitations of both possibilities, this will allow you to be flexible and ensure that you can provide the best possible support to any tactical situation.

### Lead Your Section

Effectively managing the intelligence section takes a particular combination of finesse, gumption, and intractability. If you were to study the effectiveness of S2 sections in combat, I believe you would discover that the most successful S2s are the ones who delegate and manage tasks within their sections. S2s who isolate themselves and do a majority of the work on their own tend to be less effective. Managing your section to maximize efficiency will be your biggest challenge. First and foremost, your analysts are specialized Soldiers who must accomplish tasks that require more extensive training and mental preparedness than their peers. Because of this, you must minimize the additional duties and random tasks that will sidetrack training and affect accomplishment of mission. It is imperative to keep your analysts in the fight, a guard tower is not the place for a trained and experienced intelligence analyst. You will win this battle easily if your shop is running efficiently and all of your analysts are diligently executing their duties. If the contrary is the norm for your section, you will not be able to justify exceptions for your Soldiers.

The model of task, purpose, method, and end state (TPME) is one with which your section should be intimately familiar. Most commonly it is used when developing enemy COAs; however, not all analysts are accustomed to the concept. One method I have utilized is to issue all tasks within the section using this format. It ensures that tasks are understood and creates a reasonable end state and deadline to drive the analytical process. Create and update a tasking board for your section. Tasks and deadlines should be emphasized on the display. The most important part of the display is the priority of tasks.

Prioritization is vital to the success of the S2. On any given day, there are hundreds of intelligence problems to solve, scores of products to create and update, and a vast amount of information filtering into your shop that requires processing and analysis. Without prioritization, essential and relevant tasks will be overlooked and precious time will be spent on tasks that do not meet the needs of the present situation. In combat, your tasking priority will likely change 3 to 5 times daily due to the dynamic nature of the enemy and the speed in which targets are acquired and executed. Always be prepared to shift priority of effort, or abandon a project completely.

When tasking an analyst to create a specific product, always draw an intent sketch that outlines the layout and information that you desire on the graphic. Five minutes of discussion can save you five hours of work that does not meet your intent. Empower your subordinate leaders and Soldiers by allowing them to brief products and present their analysis to the commander and staff. This fosters creativity, gives a feeling of ownership, and serves as an excellent professional development opportunity. This can begin at lower levels until they become comfortable. Teach doctrinal terms and ensure your analysts understand them so they can effectively communicate with the commander and staff. Never underestimate the hidden talents and strengths of your Soldiers; however, if they are never given the chance to display them, you will likely never discover these talents.

In combat and while engaged at a combat training center, it will be necessary to work in shifts.

Always analyze the most productive way to split the work load so that work is maximized and no part of the situation is lost through shift change. The "intel huddle" should incorporate your entire section at shift changes and follow a format that does not allow information to slip through the cracks. The night shift is an excellent opportunity to research topics for longer term projects. Band width is generally better, and distractions are more manageable in the evening. If you are in a situation where intelligence supervision is not possible around the clock, your most dependable analyst should take the reins on this shift. Provide your prioritized task list and check their work before they go off shift. During major operations, always ensure a key leader (S2, AS2, or NCOIC) is available in the TOC to answer questions, provide immediate assessments, and to recommend immediate operations or troop movements based on ISR collection. Never sell short on having someone responsible available at all times. Crucial events can and will occur at all times. Establish and post wake-up criteria for your analysts so they can send someone to find you when critical events occur. Your efforts in managing your shop for success will not be in vain; accordingly your analysts will be able to meet your expectations in a timely manner and the end result is credibility for your section.

### Create and Manage Information Requirements

Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are a frequently under-utilized tool for intelligence professionals. More often than not, these information requirements (IRs) are created solely to fill a placeholder on a slide. When used properly, they combine the commander's guidance, major intelligence gaps, and operational requirements to generate an appropriate collection plan. Your collection plan will then answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) allowing an operation to be executed, changed, or cancelled respectively. PIRs are the mechanisms which allow the S2 to fill intelligence gaps. Once the commander approves the PIRs, the S3 can then task and prioritize assets to answer these questions. This passage is not meant to gloss over the CCIR process; the assumption is that the reader has a working knowledge of these concepts.

There should be two types of PIR that are utilized in the field. The first is standing PIR, these remain the same throughout and should be based on the campaign plan. Examples are: Where are explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) being manufactured in the AO? Operational PIR, the second type, have a specific relevance to an upcoming or ongoing specific operation. Operational PIR should be as specific as possible and associated with a decision point for the commander. An example is: Does Muhhamad Ibn Ali manufacture EFPs VIC NAI 1324? This example would be relevant if your battalion was conducting an operation to neutralize EFP manufacturer's in a specific geographic area.

Much like tasking your section, collection on PIRs is done most efficiently when it is prioritized. Your commander will prioritize your PIRs, but you should assist by providing background and relevant information regarding the threat. It is acceptable to have a large number of PIRs that need to be answered, but focus on 2 or 3 at a time to maximize collection assets. PIRs must be answerable. If they cannot be answered with the assets available, restructure it as a request for information (RFI) and send it higher. If it is too vague to be answered; don't use it.

PIRs are made up of more refined questions called specific information requirements (SIRs). The SIR contains the indicators (events on the ground) that will answer the question. Structure your SIRs so that 2 or 3 coordinate to answer a PIR. If you need more SIRs then your PIR is not specific enough. If you are confused on SIR, ask yourself: What would this asset need to see to



answer the question?

The concepts of simplicity and common sense will go far in relation to your PIR and SIR. Always structure your questions at the user level. The more complicated a question is, the less likely it is to be answered in a timely manner. In your quest for information, you will have the need to collect information unrelated to PIRs. These questions are simply IRs. IRs are usually required to refine the IPB process, or to facilitate knowledge of the battlefield for future operations. An example of an IR generally looks like this: Who is the Muhktar of neighborhood X? You will have a large number of IRs, feed them to your ground units in small amounts rather than a massive list that can be overwhelming for Soldiers patrolling the streets.

## ISR

The following is a brief summary of ISR and targeting operations along with key points and lessons learned. As an S2, 60 percent of your time in combat is spent on both ISR and targeting. Few training programs are in place to assist with collection management and targeting at the battalion level. Incorporate ISR planning and execution into pre-deployment training as much as possible. Target development and planning is easier to recreate in garrison, and can be exercised at unit training events and live fire exercises. Realistic scenarios coupled with updated threat information will assist in effective training on these tasks.

ISR is simply how you are going to answer your battalion's IRs. The collection plan is what IR you have that need answered and who can answer it. Your collection plan also needs to address critical times in which the question needs answering. Once you have developed your collection plan, determine what assets are available to you in the next 72 to 96 hours and determine what IR they will collect on and the times for collection. Create an ISR synchronization matrix to graphically portray your collection activities. This will assist you in identifying gaps in coverage or when cueing, mixing, or redundancy is available and applicable. Designating one person in your shop is the best way to tackle this task. The assistant S2 or NCOIC are great candidates as it requires a lot of time and constant monitoring to ensure that IR are being answered and disseminated. Most units will require a collection plan 72 hours out to ensure assets can be provided to execute your collection.

There are two types of assets that can collect on your IR for you. The first are organic assets which consist mainly of all of your ground forces (scout and maneuver platoons), your HCTs that may be attached from higher, and any attached units that are operating within your battlespace. This limits your collection capability considerably. You may also be in a unit equipped with long range surveillance capabilities, always consider these as an asset that can collect on some IR. As a planning factor for collection, assume that higher level aviation and collection assets will not be available to collect on your IR. The second type of assets are brigade (tactical), echelons above brigade (operational), or echelons above division (strategic). You can have any number or variant of assets available given the time and location. The important take-away is to know all assets available. Make a list and post them in your TOC. Train all Soldiers in your section on the capabilities and limitations of all assets. Many times an asset will suddenly appear on station for you, if your Soldiers do not understand what it can do, the likelihood is that it will be misused or not used at all.

The most important aspect of ISR is knowing how to interface with every asset on the battlefield. Many assets will supply a direct feed that you can monitor, and most have a human interface

system so that you can communicate with the asset or asset operator. Build a cheat sheet that contains the details of interfacing with every asset available and post it in your operations area. Always remember attack and reconnaissance helicopters have many capabilities that can extend your intelligence footprint and answer IR. Many commanders focus on the direct action role of rotary wing aviation and overlook their stellar reconnaissance capabilities. Several staff members should be able and willing to assist you in planning ISR for the battalion. The U.S. Air Force TACPs can request and execute fixed wing aviation reconnaissance from multiple platforms. Your Electronic Warfare (EW) Officer can assist with support as well as provide technical expertise on all things relating to signals and electronics. The Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officer can assist with many HUMINT related IRs. Your Fire Support Officer will answer questions about the enemy's indirect fire capabilities.

These staff members will not likely reside in your back pocket as they have other duties and responsibilities so approach them often to discuss your collection plan and solicit their advice. Whether you are handling collection management, or it is a subordinate, maintain daily contact with your brigade Collection Manager. He is your gateway to all the assets that the Army has to offer. Always ask for everything and ensure your collection plan has every INT accounted for. Chances are, you won't get it all but you certainly won't get it if you don't ask. Many times your requests will cause your brigade Collection Manager to learn new methods and points of contact for different assets. As always, be proactive and never take no for an answer.

There are many additional tools and assets available to enhance your battalion's ability to collect on IRs. These force multipliers require significant planning and careful execution to have the maximum impact on your operations. Some examples of force multipliers are unattended ground sensors (UGS), camera systems (overt and covert), and special access programs (SAPs). UGS can be used to determine and characterize mobility and mobility patterns in areas that have limited ground presence. They can be especially fruitful when mixed with other Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) platforms. Training is generally the greatest constraint as employment can be tedious and affect the capabilities of the systems. Camera systems can be employed in active or passive surveillance roles to monitor areas of increased enemy activity or as a deterrent. There are many SAPs that will enhance ISR and targeting capability that are available once you are in theater.

## Targeting

Targeting is the ability to effect something or someone and leave it in the condition that you choose. That is, of course, my definition. Like many other intelligence functions, doctrine complicates matters that are simple to plan and execute. We will not delve into targeting methodologies or specifics, instead focusing on the S2 role and lessons learned. Intelligence officers are mainly focused on lethal targeting, but play a strong advisory role in the non-lethal realm. If the target is a human being, the S2 should have the lead. Targeting for intelligence professionals at the tactical level can be broken down into five easy steps:

1. Identify the threat or intelligence problem and develop a threat model.
2. Create a SITEMP of the threat or intelligence problem and identify the most likely time/place to see the threat or activity. Analyze the possible 2nd and 3rd order effects of engaging the target.
3. Create an IR regarding the threat/activity and task a collection asset(s) to locate or report on

the threat.

4. Engage the target either through kinetic or non-kinetic means.

5. Assess if engaging the target had the effect you wanted, or if you need to engage it again through the same or some other means.

Many would argue that this is over-simplified, but it works well in an environment where time is always a limiting factor.

One of the most difficult intelligence tasks to accomplish is developing a target. You know something or someone is out there, you just don't know where or when. You must decide what you want to target first which usually requires a nomination to your commander where he will bless off on assets and resources to be used to detect the target. To do this, you must create a target packet that contains all of the information or evidence that you have to prosecute the target. The next part is the one that requires a lot of imagination on the part of the S2. You have to employ assets to find, pattern, gain further information, or determine the operational status of your proposed target. At a minimum your packet should contain:

- \* Imagery of the target or target location at the best possible resolution.
- \* All intelligence reports pertaining to the target or targets activities.
- \* A listing of known associates or affiliated entities.
- \* A SITEMP of how the threat will react to the operation with two COAs.
- \* Special instructions to the actioning unit that includes specific items to be collected from the objective.
- \* A set of target criteria to determine target readiness.

When you create this packet intelligence gaps will become apparent. These intelligence gaps transform into IR about the target, and possibly PIR. Use the newly discovered IR to collect against the target until it is actionable. When the target is actionable, determine a delivery method to effect the target. These methods can range from setting up a meeting with your commander to dropping a 500 pound bomb on the target. This is the point at which evaluating 2nd and 3rd order effects is critical.

Analysis of effects and consequences is essential to effective targeting. With each target and delivery method, you have to analyze the following: What will the effect on the population be for friendly and enemy forces? What effect will this have on government and policy? What effect will this have on host nation security forces? What effect will this have on our current and future operations in this area and others? Will this decision affect the local economy? What is the likely public opinion or enemy information operation that will result from this action? All of these questions are weighed with a cost-benefit analysis that should result in the best possible delivery method for the desired effect.

As the S2, encourage the best possible method that benefits the enemy the least. Never allow

targeting that empowers the enemy, this type of targeting is counter-productive and is not focused on the endstate of the operation. Finally, after a delivery method is chosen and executed, the S2 must assess the target: Did the method achieve the desired effect? Did it have unintended or unconsidered consequences? If unintended consequences arose, they must be mitigated as soon as possible to lessen the enemy's ability to exploit the event. Targeting is the final step and the end result of the intelligence cycle. Assessments and impacts are then factored back into the process and it begins again. The ability to develop targets effectively will increase credibility and are the building blocks of accomplishing the goals laid out in your unit's campaign plan.

## Characterize the Enemy

You and your section will be responsible for producing many products during your tenure as an S2, and arguably the SITEMP is the most important. This is the means by which you portray how the enemy is arrayed and how it is operating. There are multiple ways to display your SITEMP. I recommend that you find a style that facilitates your perspective of the enemy and is understood by both your commander and S3. There are some salient points that come to mind when considering the SITEMP in the counterinsurgency environment:

1. Use a common operating picture. Ensure that the operations graphics and the enemy graphics share the same background. This facilitates the commander's ability to visualize the battlefield.
2. Create and maintain a macro level SITEMP of your AO. Depict all threat groups and their current disposition. Use tactical intent symbols to portray their current operations or goals. Assess the members' (quantify) strength and their main source of funding. Clearly depict support, disruption, and battle zones and identify any key nodes that facilitate your enemy's operations.
3. Create micro SITEMPS for subordinate units' AOs. Get daily input from company and troop commanders about enemy forces in their AOs and use input to update your macro SITEMP.
4. Major operations require COA statements and SITEMPS of the AO that your unit will operate in. This is when you apply the full-blown IPB and develop COA statements to facilitate the operations plan. Focus your efforts on enemy centers of gravity, key terrain, and their decisive operation when time constrained.
5. Target packets require SITEMPs down to the individual enemy level. Focus efforts on engagement areas, likely early warning sites, infiltration and exfiltration routes, and details of the target when time constrained.

Threat models characterize how the enemy conducts operations without regard to terrain and weather. To utilize threat models, break down your top three enemy threats and begin to analyze the specifics of how they conduct these operations. Assess the time the enemy needs to conduct the operation and break it into phases. Determine what type of logistical support is needed and where it comes from. How does the enemy communicate during the operation? Does the enemy require special transportation or technology? How does the enemy choose targets, and how does it conduct reconnaissance? Are there any ceremonial or religious aspects for the attackers? How does it handle the civilian population?

When you have answered these questions about the enemy you can reasonably determine the pattern of life for the activity examined. Find creative methods to graphically depict your study

keeping in mind simplicity and common sense. Programs like Analyst Notebook have built in features that allow you to do time-based analysis. List all of the indicators that are visible during the operation. Identify any point in the enemy's operation that he has to expose himself and will be vulnerable to collection. If you take your threat model and apply it to a specific threat group in your AO and the area that it has historically conducted this type of operation, you have just created a target.

### "Intelligence Drives Operations"

This is possibly the most used U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command catch-phrase meant to inculcate the importance of MI on the battlefield. Its significance is often down-played by operations personnel who truly believe that their plans are comprehensive and the measure of battles won and lost. As an intelligence professional, no phrase should empower you more. The simplicity and relevance of the statement could not be more significant. There are a few instances in which intelligence does not drive operations and they are all negative.

The first and most common is a lack of confidence or loss of credibility of the intelligence apparatus. This is caused by individuals or groups (units) of individuals that have missed the boat in their understanding and application of intelligence doctrine. Most prevalent is the lack of leadership and professionalism that are required to handle the responsibilities of the post. Good MI officers are a commodity in high demand, and the market is straining to supply them to the field. Often, commanders are required to "settle" with a level of professionalism that is below what is necessary. The MI Corps as a whole has to work together to transform our Corps and restore credibility to the MI apparatus. It is the duty of every MI officer to help in this struggle.

Another example of intelligence not driving operations is when commanders decide to distrust intelligence methods and conclusions and foster an environment of apathy towards intelligence within their command. These commanders put their faith in the planning process without the application of intelligence. Rarely will these commanders change their course based on relevant intelligence. The positive aspect of this notion is that there are very few senior commanders who have adopted this methodology. Often it is company and troop level commanders who will perpetuate this notion and become an obstacle to intelligence rather than a contributor. The underlying cause is arrogance and can often be overcome by presenting timely and actionable intelligence that indisputably leads to mission success. In general, commanders who support, equip, and prioritize their intelligence effort, see the best returns on their investment. Concurrently, company and troop level commanders who cooperate, provide information and feedback, and participate in their intelligence effort will see the tremendous benefit to their mission set.

The final scenario that causes conflicts is when a mission is assigned or dictated from a higher headquarters that lacks situational awareness or understanding of your AO. Many times it will be a supporting effort to a larger operation that leaves Soldiers feeling as though they are wasting their time or quite often "driving around waiting to be blown up." This is where the industrious S2 springs into action. Make every mission an intelligence mission. Generate relevant IRs, search for targets, and transform a throw away mission into something that generates success. In the current environment (Iraq and Afghanistan), there is no shortage of intelligence to be gathered, bad guys to be handled, or enemy infrastructure to be influenced. Making the best of this situation is often the most challenging aspect of the job, but arguably the most important. Strive to be creative in your use of assets and your approach to collection, work with your maneuver

forces, and expend energy convincing your higher headquarters to support your efforts.

## Conclusion

I have often suggested the theory that intelligence analysis is 80 percent art and 20 percent science. I ardently support this notion. As intelligence officers, we are overwhelmed by data. It comes in all forms: letters, numbers, pictures, spoken word, and in video. Success is still rooted in the understanding of how human beings behave, and more importantly, how they fight. The intelligence officer uses intuition, savvy, and "gut feeling", then examines corresponding data to confirm or deny theories and circumstances. Science and data certainly have their place in the process, but it is all insignificant without the human mind to analyze, interpret, and exploit the results. The successful intelligence officer is a student of all things military, political, and economic, and an expert in acquiring information of all types.

It is the goal of the U.S. Army to establish information dominance over our nation's adversaries. While the struggle for information dominance is the keystone of the IC, learning to interpret and exploit this information should be the preeminent focus of the MI officer. Experience is one of the best traits that an intelligence officer can bring to the table, but a lack of experience can be mitigated by a firm grasp of intelligence doctrine and a baseline knowledge about the enemy. Knowledge and experience can be gained by interacting with others, and no institution is structured better than the Army for this type of interaction. Credibility is the key to success. Gain and maintain credibility at all costs. Work daily to present with confidence and defend with vigilance. No intelligence officer is expected to know all the answers, seamlessly predict the enemy's movements, or expertly manipulate assets to answer all of a given commander's questions.

An intelligence officer is expected to be able to create sound and logical enemy COAs that expose friendly vulnerabilities, gather and prioritize information from a variety of sources, and effectively use systems and methods to apply both critical thinking and decision making to tactical problems. The maneuver battalion intelligence officer is the principal executor and the authority of this methodology. It is my assertion that there is no profession of arms more exigent or germane. The eventual triumph in the War on Terrorism is at stake and the positive resolution of conflicts yet to come depends on the continued development of proficient tactical level intelligence officers. The current corps of MI professionals will analyze the complexities of the most significant threats to democracy that have been experienced to date, and this cadre of officers will advise the policy and decision makers that will determine the survival of our American way of life.

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